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J. Alberto del Real Alcalá, Jaen / Spain
* 
 
“The Ideal of the Certainty in Law: The Skin and the Heart of Law” 
 
Abstract: The doubt about certainty like an absolute value in law and as an ideal full in legal system 
(argument about impossibility) is a controversial fact in contemporary legal theory. In this text I 
examine some contemporary doctrines about the classic understanding (in critical sense) of this ideal. 
I have selected the most representative doctrines: doctrine about "open texture of Law" (H.L.A. Hart), 
starting  point  in  this  discussion;  doctrine  about  "Il  Diritto  mite"  (G.  Zagrebelsky),  from  the 
continental  European  legal  tradition  at  present;  and  doctrine  about  "vagueness  in  Law"  (T.A.O. 
Endicott),  this  doctrine  is  the  most  recent,  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  legal  tradition.  Finally,  in 
Conclusions, I analyze if this doubt (argument about impossibility) contaminates (in some sense) to 
the concept of law or to the characteristics that describe law in the contemporary Constitutional State.   
Keywords: Certainty in Law; Open Texture; Vagueness in Law; Ductility in Law 
 
Summary: 
I. Introduction. 
II. The skin of law in the new constitutionalism: open texture and vagueness in law. 
III. The heart of law in the new constitutionalism: il diritto mite. 
IV. Conclusion. 
 
I. Introduction. 
The doubt about certainty like an absolute value in law and as an ideal full in legal system 
(argument  about  impossibility)  is  a  controversial  fact  in  contemporary  legal  theory
1.  I 
examine some contemporary doctrines about the classic understanding (in critical sense) 
about this ideal. I have selected the most representative doctrines:  
- The skin of law in the new constitutionalism: doctrine about "open texture of Law" 
(H.L.A. Hart, starting point in this discussion; and, doctrine about "vagueness in Law" 
(T.A.O. Endicott), this doctrine is the most recent, from the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition.  
- The heart of law in the new constitutionalism: doctrine about "Il Diritto mite" (G. 
Zagrebelsky), from the continental European legal tradition at present.  
                                                           
* Prof. Dr. J. Alberto del Real Alcalá, Professor of Philosophy of  Law,  University of Jaen, Spain. E-mail: 
adelreal@ujaen.es. Homepage: http://www4.ujaen.es/~adelreal 
1 Cfr. DEL REAL ALCALÁ, J.A.: “¿Certeza del Derecho vs. Indeterminación jurídica? El debate entre 
Positivistas y Antipositivistas”, in Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, ARSP Beiheft Nr. 106, volume I 
(Legal Theory/Legal Positivism and Conceptual Analysis, Moreso, J.J., ed.), Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1st 
Edition 2007, pp. 94-106. 2 
Finally,  in  Conclusions,  I  analyze  if  this  doubt  (argument  about  impossibility) 
contaminates (in some sense) to the concept of law or to the characteristics to describe the law 
in the contemporary Constitutional State.   
 
II. The skind of law in the new constitutionalism: open texture and vagueness in law. 
In this epigraph I show the doctrine about "open texture of Law" (1961, Herbert L.A. HART) 
and relation with the ideal of the certainty in law in the new constitutionalism. In the XXth 
century, this theoretical of law extended this open texture metaphor. This position is starting 
point for legal indetermination claim. On the contrary, others theoretical of law affirm that 
always it is possible to obtain “full” certainty in all cases. I will criticize these positions. In 
my opinion, these positions don't show the legal practice in a correct way. It is necessary to 
clarify the following thing: the positions that I show don't defend the claim on the uncertain in 
law in all cases. This claim creates legal insecurity. This claim is not my claim. Really, no 
lawyer defends this extreme position.
2 
My position defends the argument about impossibility in  some cases, not in all cases. I 
defend the argument about impossibility in borderline cases. But, I don't defend the argument 
about impossibility in clear cases. My position defends this idea: certainty in law shows limits 
in borderline cases. Therefore, ideal of certainty in law is not a full ideal. And this affirmation 
is significant.  
This affirmation has some consequences in the comprehension and description of the 
law. It is necessary to realize a second clarification: to defend an ideal about certainty in law 
with limits doesn't mean to suggest that it is convenient to introduce more vagueness in legal 
system. To defend an ideal about certainty in law with limits means to deny the claim that 
reduces the uncertainty in law to a defect of law, to a dark point of law. Legal Indetermination 
has more scope. It is not a defect of law, but an empirical characteristic of law.  
H.L.A. HART doesn't deny value to certainty in legal norms
3. However, their doctrine 
("open texture of law") questions some aspects about standard vision of certainty in law
4. 
HART provides a different description (more sophisticated) about reality in legal system
5. He 
                                                           
2 Cfr. SHAPIRO, Scott J.: “On Hart’s Way Out”, en COLEMAN, J. (ed.): Hart’s Postscript, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 149-191. 
3 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, traducción de G. R. Carrió, Abeledo-Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1998, p. 
255. 
4 HART, H.L.A.: “El positivismo jurídico y la separación entre el Derecho y la moral.”, in HART, H.L.A.: 
Derecho y Moral. Contribuciones a su análisis, Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1962, pp. 28-29. 
5 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 155 y ss.; also, HART, H.L.A.: “Postscript”, in HART, 
H.L.A.: The Concept of Law, 2.ª edition, Penélope A. Bullock y Joseph Raz, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 
238-276. 3 
rejects  a  full  conception  by  means  of  open  texture  of  law
6.  Standard  conception  is  a 
"mechanics" legal theory. Mechanics legal theory is based in the premise "everything can be 
known". Always there are previous rules for every case. Work judicial consists on searching 
for the rule corresponding to every case. Work judicial doesn't have more reach. Therefore, 
legal rules are not open.
7  
In this perspective, degree of certainty is full and, in consequence, it prejudges the future 
cases in a blind way, because we ignore the circumstances for those cases in the present time
8. 
For HART, legal rules must be intelligible. But, a precision excess in law is not desirable
9. 
Open texture of law provides a different description on law in the new constitutionalism. 
Open texture of law offers a more sophisticated description, next to the legal practice, about 
how law works in reality. This description allows verifying the following thing: standard 
vision about legal certainty doesn't provide a satisfactory explanation on legal system. This 
description doesn't recognize that the law contains precise areas, but also imprecise areas. In 
legislation, imprecise areas correspond with legal indetermination. In adjudication, imprecise 
areas correspond with uncertainty in the juridical operator to solve a case
10.  
In law application, precise areas correspond with  clear  cases.  And  imprecise  areas 
correspond with borderline cases. Truly, any legal system has necessity to have clear rules. 
But, any legal system also has necessity to have imprecise rules. In relation to imprecise rules, 
they maintain open the solution for a concrete case and in the moment of the application
11. 
Therefore, open texture concept ago possible a different description (it doesn't standardize and 
not homogeneous) about legislation. Because, open texture concept distinguishes two classes 
of legislated rules: precise and clear rules and imprecise rules and with vagueness
12. Hart's 
metaphor distinguishes a core and a penumbra area in law. 
Texture open of law responds to the following cause: human inability to advance the 
future.  Legislator  cannot  foresee  all  cases,  because  the  legislators  are  men,  they  are  not 
gods
13. This inability ends in a relative "ignorance in the facts": future facts are impossible to 
foresee, they will always be ignored. Also, this inability ends in a relative "indetermination of 
intentions" in the rules. Open texture is open texture in "legal language. And, in John's legal 
theory, open texture is a characteristic of natural language. Therefore, this characteristic is 
                                                           
6 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., p. 163.  
7 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., p. 160.  
8 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., p. 162.  
9 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 160-162.  
10 REDONDO, M.C.: “Teorías del Derecho e indeterminación normativa”, in Doxa, nº 20, Centro de Estudios 
Políticos y Constitucionales y Universidad de Alicante, Madrid, 1997, pp. 194-195.  
11 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 162-163.  
12 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 157, 168 y 175-176. 
13 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 155, 157, 159-160. 4 
also  present  in  language  of  law
14. Hart's precise rules follow the ideal of certainty in a 
standard sense. And, Hart's imprecise rules don't follow this full ideal. In definitive, contrary 
to other legal theories, for Hart's legal theory is important those  precise areas and imprecise 
areas, and both types of rules (precise rules and imprecise rules) are located in the same 
conceptual level
15. 
Texture open of law considers homogeneous description of law like unsatisfactory for the 
new  constitutionalism.  This  a ffirmation  has  some  consequences  in  application  and 
interpretation of legal norms. For example, if we accept open texture of law, our observation 
on judicial cases is  different. Now, there is not an only type of judicial case. Now, we can 
distinguish two types of judicial cases: clear cases and uncertain cases. In consequence, there 
is not an only resolution procedure type for judicial cases. These positions are defended by R. 
Dworkin with the right answer thesis
16. And also, these positions are present in the base of 
Alexy’s  perspective
17.  However,  in  Hart's  perspective,  now,  we  can  distinguish  various 
resolution procedures for judicial cases.  
For example, juridical bivalence plays in the clear cases. But, this mechanism does not 
play in the indeterminate cases. On the contrary, discretion plays in the uncertain cases. But, 
this mechanism does not play in the clear cases. Also, principles and rights are weighted in 
uncertain cases
18. But, principles and rights are not  weighted in clear cases. This is related 
with the following idea: uncertain cases are cases dominated by the uncertainty. Resolution in 
clear cases is developed by tribunals or by officials. They keep in mind to the circumstances 
and interests in the conflict. Because, also, then, judges will have to provide a resolution in 
the borderline cases
19. They will obtain this resolution from the frame
20 of open alternatives in 
each case
21. This resolution will vary in each case.
22  
                                                           
14 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 155, 157, 159-160, 163 y 173. Cfr., ITURRALDE SESMA, 
V.: Lenguaje legal y sistema jurídico. Cuestiones relativas a la aplicación de la ley, Tecnos, Madrid, 1989, pp. 
32 y ss. 
15 HART, H.L.A.: “El positivismo jurídico y la separación entre el Derecho y la moral”, cit., p. 29; cfr. HART, 
H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., p. 167. 
16 DWORKIN, R. “Thirty Years On”, in Harvard Law Review, vol. 115, 2002, pp. 1654-1687.  
17 ALEXY, R.: The argument from injustice. A reply to legal positivism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. 
18 DWORKIN, R.: Law’s Empire, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000, pp. 337 y ss.  
19 Vid. DEL REAL ALCALÁ, J.A.: Ámbitos de la ‘doctrina de la indeterminación’ del Derecho”, in Jueces para 
la Democracia, Madrid, n.º 56, julio/2006, Madrid, pp. 48-58. 
20 DEL REAL ALCALÁ. J.A.: “¿‘Paradoja’ de H. Kelsen sobre la indeterminación jurídica?”, in Cuadernos 
Electrónicos de Filosofía del Derecho, Revista de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Jurídica y Política, n.º 15, 
Madrid, 2007.   
21 Cfr. DEL REAL ALCALÁ, J.A.: “Desacuerdos en la teoría jurídica sobre el concepto de certeza en el 
Derecho”, in Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, nueva serie, Año XXXIX, n.º 117, Septiembre-
Diciembre 2006, Revista del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 
México D.F., pp. 755–775. 
22 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 158-161.  5 
In this sense, texture open of law recognizes a capacity for the legal creation to the 
judges
23. This imperium plays in rules with vagueness and in imprecise and uncertain rules
24. 
Because of this function, the judge produces new rules for legal system
25. In definitive, this 
area in law is an area dominated by uncertainty
26. Here, the ideal of certainty in law is not 
susceptible for full realization
27. The skin of law is open texture of law. 
But,  also,  another  interesting  point  of  view  on  the  skin  of  law  in  the  new 
constitutionalism is the thesis  about “vagueness in law”. This position is the most recent 
doctrine on the skin of law from Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. This position is defended by 
T.A.O. Endicott. The purpose of thesis is to provide an opportunity for philosophers of law to 
discuss problems about vagueness: for example, if, in fact, law is necessarily very vague
28. In 
Endicott's position, if vague standards provide no guidance in some cases, how can the life of 
a community be ruled by law? This problem has to do with the ideal of the rul e of law and 
with the very idea of law
29. According to Endicott, vagueness in law is an important and 
unavoidable feature of law
30.   
Three arguments base the previous affirmation.  
First, precision of law is not necessarily desirable
31. The legislators use  vague laws. 
They not always look for a precise regulation. Law is vague because the precision not always 
is  useful  for  regulation  of  the  life  in  the  communities.  And  the  legislators  know  this 
circumstance.
32 
Second, precise formulations not always produce precise laws. Laws formulated with a 
precise  language  don't  always  produce  precise  laws  in  the  moment  of  application  and 
                                                           
23 Vid. ASIS ROIG, R. de: Jueces y normas. La decisión judicial desde el Ordenamiento, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 
1995, pp. 281 y ss. 
24 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 155-156, 159 y 179-180. 
25 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 159, 161, 169, 179 y 183; vid. PRIETO SANCHÍS, L.: 
“Neoconstitucionalismo y ponderación judicial”, in CARBONELL, Miguel, Neoconstitucionalismo(s), Trotta, 
Madrid, 2003, pp. 123-158.  
26 Cfr. GARCIA AMADO, J.A.: “¿Ductilidad del Derecho o exaltación del juez? Defensa de la ley frente a 
(otros) valores y principios”, in Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho, t. XIII, cit., pp. 65-86. 
27 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 158, 167 y 179-180. 
28 ENDICOTT, E.: “Law and Language”, in COLEMAN, J. and SHAIRO, S. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 955-960. 
29 Cfr. DEL REAL ALCALÁ, J.A.: “La indeterminación de la ‘estructura del deber’ de los jueces en el Estado 
de Derecho”, in Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho, Ministerio de Justicia, Madrid, 2006, pp. 241-265. 
30 HART, H.L.A.: El concepto de Derecho, cit., pp. 158, 167 y 179-180. 
31 ENDICOTT, E.: Vagueness in Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; Spanish translation: ENDICOTT, 
T.: La vaguedad en el Derecho, translation by Prof. J. Alberto del Real Alcalá and Juan Vega Gómez, Dykinson, 
Madrid, 2006, p. 21. 
32 ENDICOTT, E.: “Law is Necessarily Vague”, en Legal Theory, nº 7, Oxford, 2001, p. 379: “In fact, law is 
necessarily very vague”; Spanish translation: ENDICOTT, T.: “El Derecho es necesariamente vago”, translation 
by Prof. J. Alberto del Real Alcalá, in Derechos y Libertades, n.º 12, Instituto de Derechos Humanos ‘Bartolomé 
de las Casas’ de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and Boletín Oficial del Estado, Madrid, Enero-Diciembre 
2003, pp. 180-182. 6 
interpretation of the legal norms. The reasons are the interpretive techniques and powers of 
equity in the judges. These two elements facilitate to give a vague effect to precise legislative 
formulations.
33 
And third, functions in law demand vague standards. The reason is: any legal system 
needs to regulate a great variety of human activity in a general way. This is possible only 
across abstract standards. And they are necessarily vague. Therefore, law demands necessarily 
vague and abstract standards to carry out some indispensable functions.
34 
In definitive, we can affirm that the three previous arguments are describing the skin of 
law in the new constitutionalism. In consequence, the vagueness identifies the skin of law in 
the contemporary Constitutional State. 
 
III. The heart of law in the new constitutionalism: il diritto mite.  
The  doctrine  about  "Il  Diritto  mite"  has  been  formulated  by  G.  Zagrebelsky,  from  the 
continental European legal tradition at present. Mite has been translated (to the Spanish) like 
"ductil" by Prof.ª Marina Gascón. I will use the expression "ductile law" or ductility. 
The contemporary legal practice in the Constitutional State is not identified fully with 
some habitual characteristics of law. For example, the habitual conception about principle of 
certainty in law. Doctrine “il Diritto mite” questions the juridical certainty like a full value 
and a full ideal in law. Because of the new constitutionalism, the contemporary law demands 
a deep renovation
35. 
In the Diritto mite, the critique to the rigid conception about certainty in law contains the 
following premises: 
First, the law for principles is the origin in the Diritto mite. The europeans legal systems 
include  rules-norms  and  principles-norms
36.  Besides  the  rules,  this  fact  means  to 
constitutionalize the values and the principles
37. Both, rules and principles, have direct 
application  in  the  new  constitutionalism
38.  The  application  of  principles  is  different  to 
application of rules
39. In general, principles are not structured according to a hierarchy of 
                                                           
33 ENDICOTT, T.: “El Derecho es necesariamente vago”, cit., pp. 182-184.  
34 ENDICOTT, T.: “El Derecho es necesariamente vago”, cit., pp. 184-188 y 189.  
35 ZAGREBELSKY, G.: Il diritto mitte. Legge, diritti, giustizia, G. Einaudi, Torino, 1992; Spanish translation, 
ID., El derecho dúctil, Trotta, Madrid, 4
a ed., 2002, pp. 9-10.   
36 Vid. COLEMAN, Jules:The Practice of Principle: in Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. 
37 ZAGREBELSKY, G.: El derecho dúctil, cit., p. 150. 
38 Vid, GARCÍA DE ENTERRÍA, E.: La Constitución como norma y el Tribunal Constitucional, 3.ª ed., Cívitas, 
Madrid, 1991. 
39 ZAGREBELSKY, G.: El derecho dúctil, cit., p. 111. 7 
values
40.  This  hierarchy  would  be  incompatible  with  the  pluralistic  character  of  the 
contemporary society
41. For this reason, in the new constitutionalism, the rules must agree 
with the constitutional principles
42.   
Second, in  the new constitutionalism, the juridical  practice generates a contemporary 
crisis in the principles of generality, abstraction and certainty. If these principles were rigid, 
they could not describe correctly the juridical practice in the constitutional Democracy. For 
that reason, the best characteristic to describe to the present law is the "ductility". Law is 
ductile and the ductility in law is constitutional ductility
43. Ductility means that the values and 
constitutional principles cannot have absolute character The  ductility shows  the essential 
character of law in the present Constitutional States
44. In definitive, the ductility is the heart of 
law en the new constitutionalism.  
And third, according to the ductility, absolute conception about the certainty of law is not 
a realistic objective, and is not a desirable objective, in the present legal systems.
45  
In  definitive,  according  to  the  previous  characteristics,  if  the  skin  of  law  in  the 
contemporary Constitutional State is open texture and vagueness in law, the heart of law is “il 
diritto mite”. In the contemporary Constitutional State, law has a ductile heart. 
 
IV. Conclusion. 
Texture open of law, vagueness in law and Diritto mite consider homogeneous description of 
law like unsatisfactory. I relate this unsatisfied situation with argument of the impossibility 
about the ideal of the certainty in law in the new constitutionalism. My position defends the 
argument about impossibility in some cases (borderline cases), not in all cases in the legal 
system. Because: 
-The juridical practice generates a contemporary crisis in the principles of generality, 
abstraction and certainty. 
-In contemporary Constitutional State, law is a law for principles. The plural societies 
(Constitutional Democracy) are incompatible with a rigid law. They demand a flexible 
law, a ductile law. Law for principles is a ductile law (Diritto mite). 
                                                           
40 Véase MORESO, J.J.: “Conflictos entre principios constitucionales”, in CARBONELL, M., 
Neoconstitucionalismo(s), cit., pp. 99-121. 
41 ZAGREBELSKY, G.: El derecho dúctil, cit., p. 124. 
42 ZAGREBELSKY, G.: El derecho dúctil, cit., p. 113. 
43 ZAGREBELSKY, G.: El derecho dúctil, cit., 2002, p. 14, and pp. 14-15. 
44 Vid. DEL REAL ALCALÁ, J.A.: “Sobre la indeterminación del Derecho y la Ley constitucional. El caso del 
término ‘nacionalidades’ como concepto jurídico indeterminado”, in Derechos y Libertades, n.º 11, Instituto de 
Derechos Humanos ‘Bartolomé de las Casas’ de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid y Boletín Oficial del 
Estado, Madrid, Enero-Diciembre 2002, pp. 223-250. 
45 ZAGREBELSKY, G.: El derecho dúctil, cit., pp. 125 and 146-147. 8 
-According  to  the  ductility,  absolute  conception  about  the  certainty  of  law  is  not  a 
realistic objective, and is not a desirable objective. 
-Texture open of law recognizes a capacity for the legal creation to the judges (new 
rules);  
-Precision of law is not necessarily desirable. 
-Precise formulations not always produce precise laws.  
-Functions in law demand vague standards. 
These characteristics are significant characteristics. And these characteristics have some 
consequences:  if  the  ideal  of  certainty  in  law  is  not  a  full  ideal  in  the  contemporary 
Constitutional State, the skin of law is open texture and vagueness; and the heart of law is a 
heart ductile.  
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